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Abstract 
The aim of this paper has been to address the apparent paradox that culture 
has been the high profile victim of funding cuts in the period of austerity; at 
the same time culture has prospered. Is culture then the ‘poster child for 
resilience’?  
The paper seeks to de-couple the notion from neo-liberalism and austerity. It 
counters with an argument that resilience as a concept is relational, it does not 
have a unitary meaning and its forms will change depending on context (that is 
the cultural field, and the field of governance). Hence, the strange survival of 
culture is explained not by austerity, but by the dynamism of the cultural field. 
However, this disjunction between governance and culture also carried a 
number of risks and problems. 
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Resilience: Learning from the cultural economy 
 
Introduction 
 
In the UK as in many nations, the cultural economy has been one of the few 
sectors of the economy that has weathered the storm of the global recession 
(Office for national statistics 2016). International economic performance has 
held up, and indeed grown; particularly in the Global South (UNCTAD 2010, 
UNESCO 2013). Even in the nations and cities of the North culture has held on. 
For many it is surprising to see the cultural economy taking its place as a basic 
industry in urban areas. Commonly accounting for between 5-10% or 
employment, and growing (Freeman 2007); plus, it is no longer ‘dependant’; in 
fact, it is a driver of local economies (Pratt 2011). 
 
These facts run against the tide of how urban planners and policy makers 
conceive of cities and of culture (Pratt 2014). This paper addresses this 
disjuncture by addressing the question of how culture and why culture seems 
to have survived and thrived under conditions of economic austerity, and 
apparent state withdrawal from support. At face value the urban cultural 
economy is a poster child of ‘resilience’. This paper questions such an easy 
conclusion, and points to a deeper appreciation of the cultural can economy 
and cities, above and beyond the superficial manifestation of ‘resilience’ as an 
ability to ‘bounce back’ after an external shock’ (Christopherson, Michie et al. 
2010). 
 
The cultural economy (that is in its broad sense, including both for and not-for 
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profit activities) has been subjected to some substantive challenges. In the city 
of Newcastle, a zero-budget was set for culture (Clark-Jenkins 2013). This was 
clearly the logical conclusion of relentless local state budgetary constraints, 
and the symbolic role of culture being the first victim (as opposed to 
education, or social care; although these have followed). In the 2010-15 period 
funding for local authorities in the UK was cut by 20%, analyses indicate that 
the cultural budgets fell overall by 16% (Harvey 2016). Indicating that some 
authorities had ‘protected’ culture, others such as Newcastle had effectively 
sacrificed culture. At the national level the comprehensive spending review 
reduced the funding for the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (including 
the Arts Council) by 29.6% for the period 2010-15 (House of Commons 2011; 
para 28). The headline figure disguises the fact that the Arts Council decided to 
cut its administration budget by 50%, thereby protecting nation funded 
organisations which suffered only 6.9% cuts (House of Commons 2011; para 
12). 
 
Was culture dead? Of course not, and the reason is in part because culture has 
changed, and the part of it that is wholly dependent on state funding has 
diminished. Culture is now a complex co-dependency of activities that go 
beyond traditional boundaries: of culture, or the for profit, and of paid work. 
The message here is not that cultural passions will sustain the sector through 
thick and thin, that is – as we will argue – a simplistic and inaccurate reading of 
the cultural economy. Rather, that culture survived because it was also 
adapted and innovated away from normative support and governance systems 
(that had in effect failed it long ago). As the Select Committee reports, ‘an 
emerging model of arts funding is for one-third of the income to come from 
state subsidy, one-third from box office, and the remainder from commercial 
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revenue sources 
 
In Newcastle, as well as many other cities, a new cultural economy has been 
emergent, and its changed form, requires us to explore the new modes of 
governance and evaluation of its relative health. After seeking to clarify what 
we mean by resilience, we move to stressing governance as well as the unique 
structure of the cultural economy 
 
 
The paper is not an apology for austerity, but an insight into the current 
conjuncture. However, in the midst of which we can see new arrangements. 
Culture is called on to be many things: to support idealist culture for the nation 
state, to be an instrument of social inclusion and to provide economic growth 
(Belfiore 2002). This call to be a hybrid object is the challenge. It links to 
arguments that suggest that policy making can be more effective in terms of 
managing from the middle in hybrid fields (especially where determining 
outcomes is subject to democracy). 
 
Resilience as a stance 
 
There is now an extensive literature on resilience in two broad sub-fields, 
those of economic development and those of environmental management. 
Both are marked by similar tensions between a dominant engineering or social 
physics conception of processes, and those of a social and institutional 
character: the former are dominant (Bristow 2010, Pike, Dawley et al. 2010, 
Davoudi, Shaw et al. 2012, Martin, Sunley et al. 2015, Pratt 2015). Moreover, 
resilience has been mobilised in debates regarding potential responses and 
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preferred responses to the politically imposed funding cuts to public services 
under the name of ‘austerity programmes’.  
 
By discussing resilience in this way austerity, and the neo-liberal economic 
thought that seeks to justify it, resilience is naturalised, as if it were a physical 
process. Accordingly, resilience is presented as a stance - a static position to 
adopt - not a strategy. It is an atomistic response to an overwhelming threat 
that requires resistance, and the magical property of ‘bounce-back’. 
Overwhelmingly, such accounts are a-social and focused on the physical 
properties and capabilities of the subject of the threats using limited 
technocratic evaluations. The result is that ‘non-resilience’ is interpreted as a 
failure of governance, and the lack of a ‘can do’ attitude. 
 
 The characterisation of a resilient stance is of the ‘survivalist’, the 
responsibility to be prepared: to strengthen defences, to stock up to survive 
the shock, and then to bounce back. The same characterisation applies to 
humans as well as physical materials. Accordingly, there is a focus on ‘stress-
testing’ and securing the robustness of systems, and a technocratic control.  
 
Ironically, in this dominant interpretation of resilience whilst strength is 
highlighted the implicit assumption is that subjects (physical and human) are 
constructed as fragile, or have minimal flexibility. Flexibility is attained by 
relationship to the wider system through a signal and response feedback. The 
system is predefined, based upon an a priori definition processes, into sub-
systems (process silos), the result being that questions of causality are shifted 
outside of the realm of calculation. It is not possible to question the threat, or 
how it might be mitigated at source; let alone redefine who and why it is 
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directed in such a way. Moreover, that the cycle of threat, attack and recovery 
is a natural cycle, one that will always return to, or aim to return to, its point or 
origin. There is little attention to growth, adaptation and learning. 
 
These conceptual foundations both proscribe and justify responses to a threat, 
and sustain and support a ‘resilient stance’. They encourage humans to be part 
of a natural system that has to be resisted and not controlled, and one to 
which there is only one possible response. 
 
The economic and physical planning system is put in a difficult position in these 
debates. The connection to the physical sciences, especially in environmental 
protection, as well as their philosophical legacy of systems thinking, opens an 
easy acceptance of the resilient stance (Davoudi, Shaw et al. 2012). This is 
reinforced by government agencies tasking planning bodies to be ‘resilient’, 
that is to adopt the stance. 
 
It is not surprising that researchers working on planning and economic 
development questions have queried this a-social account, and its physicalist 
foundations. A body of counter- argument has developed; critically, the key 
point is the attention to causality and process: that is, recognising the social 
constitution of responses. 
 
Alternative responses point to some less contentious, but important, issues 
such as the scale and spatial extent of threats and responses; whilst these 
would be accepted in principle from the normative position, what the critical 
position adds concerns governance across and between scales; questioning a 
simply technocratic hierarchy. However, the most telling criticism is that of 
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evolution and adaptation. Rhetorically, such terms fit with the lexicon of 
systems thinking, but the arguments concern the transformation of the 
subjects (the nodes of a system), not simply the relations and feedback. That 
is, it offers the focus on transformation and change to the subjects as a way of 
being ‘resilient’; that is not bending, and bounding back, but transforming and 
changing. Such a process might be characterised as an adaptation, evolution 
and potentially a learning one. 
 
Supporting this counter position, Ron Martin and colleagues make a very 
useful intervention that helps to pull us back from the ‘resilience as stance’ 
position, and toward a ‘resilience as strategy’ one. They argue that resilience 
has a diversity of types of response, and a range of causes of those responses. 
Moreover, they state that these diversities of response and cause are rooted in 
three inter-related factors: composition, context and connection. Composition 
being about the particular configuration of the activity or industry; connection 
being the quality of relationships between actors, networks and institutions; 
and context, the embedding of these within wider local, regional and 
international institutions. 
 
This position opens a more social, and change-focused, perspective; critically, 
although not directly on Martin’s (Martin, Sunley et al. 2015) agenda, it raises 
significant questions of governance. The remainder of this paper takes up this 
challenge. First, we interrogate the particularities of the object, the cultural 
economy; then we review what the challenges and possibilities of governance 
are. Second, we explore some examples of cultural transformation in practice. 
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The cultural field 
 
The common assumptions and conceptions of the cultural field are partial, and 
temporally and institutionally bound; that is to say they are embedded and 
evolutionary. On one hand, it is normative to see the cultural field as 
‘exceptional’; support and finance for the traditional cultural field is commonly 
justified by reference to social idealism. On the other hand, the transformation 
of the cultural economy and its for-profit dimensions can be viewed as like any 
other aspect of the economy. As we will outline here, both positions are 
flawed. 
 
The cultural exceptionalism position is primarily a backward-looking one, to a 
period when cultural was state funded as part of an idealist nationalist project. 
The focus was on the maintenance and conservation of a particular idea of 
culture and its material forms; and of the communication of the cultural values 
to a wider public. Such a system was focused on consumption insulated from 
change, new production, and linked to public funding. 
 
The emergence of the cultural economy is marked by a strong for profit and 
‘production’ focus, in this sense a new economic sector; and to a lesser extent, 
the development of new not-for-profit art forms: these might be considered 
the socially-funded ‘innovation pool’ of the arts. Moreover, they should not be 
defined as ‘outside’ of the system; rather they should be included in within it. 
 
These two systems of culture and economics have co-evolved and are better 
conceptualised as a totality: what has been termed a cultural production 
system. The cultural production system offers a more holistic and inter-related 
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conception of cultural (re-)production taking in conception, making, 
distribution, consumption, and archiving (Pratt 1997, Peterson and Anand 
2004).  
 
The normative classification of the boundaries of the cultural field (or system) 
have been imposed by governance and funding systems, and are not internal 
to cultural production. In this sense, what we can observe is that in many 
respects the recent history of the cultural economy is that of which it has 
escaped the control of governance bodies. Illustrative of this has been the 
recalibration of governance and government that may take place. In 1997 the 
UK government created a new government Department (the Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport), and its status upgraded to that of a cabinet role 
(replacing and extending the old Department of National Heritage) in order to 
respond to the new object of policy (mainly the creative industries). 
 
As we will note below, the traditional support for culture, based upon a 
welfare economics approach (Throsby 2010), is imperilled by the reduction in 
state funding. However, the support for the creative economy is mis-focused 
as it is patently not a normative economic object (the economy); it has a 
particular compositional (see above) and operational character. The operation 
of the creative economy is in part generated by its specific organisational 
structure; a bifurcated form with a few very large firms, and a vast majority not 
simply small firms, but comprised of micro-enterprises and the self-employed 
(Andres and Round 2015). Moreover, the enterprises are not of the familiar 
type; they are best described as serial project-based enterprises (Grabher 
2002). That is, they are firms created for a single project, and dispersed and 
reformed for a subsequent project. Continuity is not a characteristic of the 
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individual firm or worker, rather change and transformation. 
 
The organisational forms outlined above create needs for co-ordination; 
therefore, the role of network intermediaries are often critical to systemic 
continuity and change. This is a common weakness that is traded-off by the 
winner-takes-all character of the sector (Frank and Cook 1996). Namely, that 
due to the radical uncertainty that new products will find a market (indeed, the 
process of is making markets for products) the risk and uncertainty is high. 
Winners gain monopoly profits, but at a system level such gains cross-subsidise 
the ‘losers’. Finally, the whole system has a very fast turnover time where one 
product replaces another with unique speed (and hence, creates a need for 
hyper innovation). It is a system that at an individual level encourages 
immediacy, instead of planning for the future. Indeed, it can be argued that 
the production system form of governance enables such radical cross-
subsidisation and an ability to hedge risks against the future. 
 
As if this radical cultural production process was not extreme enough, the 
cultural economy draws heavily on the nor-for-profit for skills and ideas; as 
noted above, it is in effect an informal laboratory. These combined 
characteristics – in organisational form, process, and outcome – generate 
governance needs at odds with either traditional economic planning, or state 
funded culture. As we will reflect below, it is perhaps an irony that the cultural 
field has not been simply resilient, but has grown through the periods of 
austerity. This fact indicates that what the culture sector potentially offers is a 
lesson not of a resilient stance, but of a resilient, adaptive and evolutionary 
practice. 
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Resilience as a mode of Governance  
 
The challenges and possibilities of governance are not a pre-given but are 
limited by the particular modality of governance at a specific time. Northern 
European and North American cities have been caused to adopt a broad set of 
neo-liberal assumptions about economic management, and the role of the 
state. In essence this has been mobilised through the establishment of a new 
range of justifications, and accountability tests, for policy actions. Neo-
liberalism has played out in various ways under both the specifics of state 
institutions, and the particularities of the object of governance (culture in this 
case). An important aspect of such change is that of history and the evolution 
of responses as an adaptation to the past. 
 
As indicated above the form of the cultural field and its justificatory regimes 
provided by the state to legitimate action have changed. What were previously 
idealist, and targeted at nation building, have become economic. In recent 
years there has been a flip of concern between that of consumption to 
production (narrowly defined). We have indicated above, that such a 
transformation did not overlap with the actual shifts in the cultural economy 
which correspond more closely to a hybrid form of production system. In so 
doing, the cultural economy has out-grown its traditional governance form. 
The creation of the DCMS in the UK (echoed in many countries, although not in 
the US) indicated one step change; as did another, the adoption of the term 
creative industries: again stressing that governance and its objects co-evolve. 
 
The broader field of governance has not stood still, whilst reforming to 
accommodate new ‘objects’ of government is one step, another is the 
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transformation of governance itself. As I will show, these new forms have 
within them particular assumptions of what resilience is. In short, resilience is 
a mode of governance. Taking up Martin et al’s (Martin, Sunley et al. 2015) 
challenge we have already pointed to the particularity of composition, the 
creative sector; now we turn to the process of governance. Extending this idea, 
we now examine here the various reasons and responses to resilience encoded 
within neo-liberalism. The section has three parts that seek to develop this 
debate concerning objectives, scales and justifications. 
 
Objectives and means 
 
At their simplest level austerity politics and practice are linked to doing more 
with less, being efficient and saving money. However, austerity politics are 
simply the external manifestation of a more systematic mode of governance 
aimed at the repurposing of the state. Such re-purposing seeks to shrink state 
expenditure and substitute them with other funds. Thus resource reduction is 
accompanied by reorganisation, most significantly through contracting out 
services. Such transformations require a new regulatory control of minimum 
service standards, which are subject to dilution under the ‘Dutch auction’ of 
the tendering process (Peck 2012). What was once a social obligation now 
becomes a point of market equilibrium. 
 
Aside from the erosion of funding, and the undermining of quality, and quality 
control, in favour of price the most insidious aspect of such a process is the 
atomistic assumptions of the smallest accounting unit. The potentiality of 
cross-subsidy to deal with risk and uncertainty is removed; such risk is resolved 
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onto the individual contractor who will be replaced if they ‘fail’. As such it 
creates a radically unstable system of short term, precarious employment and 
contracting; moreover, it creates institutions and organisations that are risk 
averse: that is fragile and brittle, hardly fit to ‘bounce back’. 
 
Within such neo-liberal governance regimes, the focus is on the accounting 
framework limited to a specific time-period: developmental and adaptive 
approaches are undermined, as profits and returns are also atomised. Staff 
and product development, let alone training, research and development 
(unless delivered just-in-time) cannot be resourced. 
 
On one hand, it is not surprising that under such circumstances that the stock 
‘resilience’ response is to use ‘free labour’ of interns and volunteers, to seek 
out communities of practice, and of knowledge exchange (‘free innovation’): in 
short, to seek socially available benefits. It is ironic that the more fiercely 
marketised the cultural sector is, the more it seeks out the non-market sector 
to retain its resilience. 
 
On the other hand, the more the private field is drawn into the state. The lack 
of funding leads to the search for various forms of sponsorship. Most ‘publicly 
funded cultural bodies’ are now substantially in receipt of sponsorship. 
Corporate sponsors seek publicity, but they also benefit from access to 
knowledge of cultural institutions. 
 
Overall, what this process generates is a very dispersed constituency of 
‘stakeholders’ with a variety of interests. There are the formal stakeholders 
providing money, but we have to consider the informal ones too; those who 
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provide labour (volunteers and interns). However, generally, only the former 
gets to be represented in policy making. 
 
Scale and scope 
 
The architecture of governance is apt to be transformed under neo-liberal 
imperatives to shrink and outsource, and further to be required to do more 
with less. In turn, the ability of organisations to respond and react is structured 
by this institutional transformation. Significantly, the inherited structure, with 
the DNA of previously cultural norms of delivery encoded in it, plays an 
important role. 
 
Put simply, the normative objects of policy (culture in this case) are reflected in 
the institutional structures of government: they are isomorphic. Over time 
routinisation and accounting practices re-inforce departmental boundaries, 
professional expertise and practices further strengthen them until one 
develops a ‘silo’. (The analogy is with massive vertical grain silos) (Francesca 
and Sylvain 2010). The routinisation of decision making and policy action is 
internal to the silo/department and efficiencies and effectivities follow. 
Everything is fine if the delivery objectives and policy focus, let alone the policy 
object, remain the same. 
 
Culture has suffered change in two ways. First, as we have seen budgetary 
reductions have in diminished culture departments, denuding them of 
expertise and capabilities. This has created new and complex 
interdependencies of funding regimes and governance responsibilities. As 
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noted above national portfolio organisations (NPO), which operate at the local 
level (for example orchestras or theatre) have been shielded from cuts (by 
cutting administration instead). Hence over the 2010-15 period whilst 
nationally cuts were 26.9% to the arts council, funding for NPOs increased by 
17%. However, the proportion of funding derived from local government for 
NPOs fell from 8% to 5% (Harvey 2016). Hence the complex balance of (lack of) 
local authority funding to ‘unlock’ the national NPO funds. 
 
Second, local and national cultural agencies’ scope of action, or desired action, 
now necessarily extends outside of ‘culture’ as previously defined: most 
obviously, this now includes the economic, but it extends much further than 
this especially into the social realm (Belfiore 2002). However, as noted above 
institutional constraints – as represented by the silo – can limit this. 
 
The scale of an institution or policy agency is important here. Larger, national, 
institutions are able to attract investment and sponsorship as they advertising 
reach is sufficient to justify the stakeholder’s interests. Accordingly, budgets 
can be balanced (although they may be challenged in terms of satisfying 
particular stakeholder objectives). At a smaller scale sponsorship may be 
absent, but the free labour of volunteering can make a huge difference of 
operational budgets. Institutions that suffer most lie between these two 
extremes; for example, municipal museums (Babbidge 2000, House of 
Commons 2011).  
 
Added to the crisis of funding discussed in the previous part, this mismatch of 
the institution with the object of governance, and particularly the need to 
work horizontally, presents a substantial block to governance. On one hand, 
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there is the challenge of cross-silo working; on the other, there is the challenge 
of working outside the institution, increasingly with external bodies (formal 
stakeholders, and informal groups) which incurs increased transactional costs. 
 
The model of resilience implied in the neo-liberal approach is to network and 
unlock resources from elsewhere to do more with less. However, the 
necessary power and authority of decision making is lacking (or simply lies with 
the most economically powerful institution). The danger is the creation of an 
ever wider dispersed agency with little, or any, co-ordination or guidance 
which focuses on short-term interests. Alternatively, it generates the challenge 
of working across multi-disciplinary agencies where the power and legitimacy, 
and promotion, remains locked up in mono-disciplinary silos. 
 
Justifications 
 
Whilst the headline of neo-liberalism is one of reducing public spending, 
accompanied by the watchwords of austerity making do with less, arguably the 
key transformation in governance under neo-liberalism concerns the 
justificatory regime that is ushered in (Power 1997). By normalising the 
atomistic logic of the auditor, and the settlement of market equilibrium a 
whole sub-set of questions regarding quality are negated. This is particularly 
serious for the field of culture, where the value offer is central to its raison 
d’etre. 
 
The first set justificatory changes relate to the conditions under which culture 
should be supported. The traditional role has been minimised to the point of 
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obliteration: idealist support for the humanistic values of culture, and the soft-
power of particular values that sustain specific ideas of the nation state. These 
arguments were previously mobilised by philanthropists, and the designers of 
the welfare state, to underpin the allocation of resources to culture. 
 
On one hand the emergence of a self-supporting (for the most part) vibrant 
economic force of the creative economy is a perfect exemplar of neo-liberal 
market values. However, as we have noted, the structure of the cultural 
economy was far from normal, and required support. The default support was 
in effect to ‘socialise’ the cultural system, that is to provide a ‘non-economic’ 
safety-net for free. 
 
On the other hand, the traditional cultural core has been forced to seek 
funding elsewhere, or to socialise its labour. However, the process is more 
extensive. In order to justify the limited spending on culture a new justification 
was imposed on the sector, that of social impact. Institutions were required to 
prioritise social inclusion in order to be eligible for public funding. The ways 
that this was achieved was through a new technology of government practice: 
New Public Sector Management (NPSM)(Hood 1995).  
 
NPSM was an approach to policy evaluation and budgetary control whereby 
long and short term management was linked to performance targets. The 
selection of targets was a major operational challenge, as data was not 
collected, nor feasible, on cultural meaning. Accordingly, the operational 
requirement required a proxy, one that was already available. For many 
museums for example, seeking to demonstrate how they were serving the 
widest community a measure of footfall at the entry of museums was used. 
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Clearly, enumerating of bodies crossing a threshold of a museum tells you 
something, but nothing about purpose, meaning and transformation. 
However, the NPSM system requires targets, and regular performance against 
them; funding is directly related to these indicators. Professionally, this puts 
museum directors and staff in a bind; they have a commitment to the older 
objectives, but they are evaluated by the new ones (Bishop 2012).  
 
Neo-liberalism established and legitimated the need of a system to be 
monitored and audited, so as to justify (and ever-diminishing) funding is the 
need for data and evaluation techniques. On the later, we have a paradox in 
that the processes under investigation in the arts and culture are long term, 
slow processes, that yield results in decades, rather than years or months; 
however, these are monitored by annual budgetary systems that require a 
measure of return on investment each year, and the instant impact at the end 
of every project.  
 
The data needs of the new cultural management system are significant, and for 
various reasons do not exist. First, as noted above, there is the problem of un-
measurability of core ideas like ‘transformation’, or ‘insight’, and their 
replacement by poor proxies such as footfall through the gallery entrance hall. 
Second, as the mode of justification (in the old welfare system) previously did 
not require data, and relied upon ‘special pleading’ as regards to the value of 
culture, as a consequence data were not collected nor systematically 
developed. Those that were available focused on material flows (people and 
money), and not on ideas, knowledge and culture. 
 
For some the solution to this problem is considered to lie in ‘big data’. This is 
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an attractive idea to neo-liberals and market economists who see the lack of 
perfect data as the reason for market failure. Big data thus promises to 
develop the perfect system (Andrejevic 2013). That is data produced for other 
purposes (usually harvested from social media) that might be used as a proxy 
for the variables that are really required.  
 
A predictable technocratic response to the governance challenges in the 
cultural sector has come from the idea that ‘big data’ can be sourced to ‘fill the 
gaps’, and that it can be used to inform policy action. For some, the future is 
where governance could be replaced by an algorithm (Leszczynski 2016). The 
conclusion seems to be that correlation is far more important than causation. 
More significantly such proposition seems to feed into the idea that markets 
can be self-governing systems, and all that is hindering them is the availability 
of ‘perfect’ (or proxy) information upon which to allocate resources. 
 
Beyond resilience 
 
The cultural sector has suffered the most drastic funding cuts because of the 
adoption of neo-liberal inspired austerity measures. On one hand, culture is 
subject endlessly deferred execution via ‘salami cuts’; on the other the sector 
has not only survived, but grown and prospered (due to their organisational 
transformation, and through accessing new funding sources). In normative 
terms, this makes the cultural sector ‘super resilient’. However, I have argued 
that this would be a misinterpretation that failed to pay attention to the way 
that culture and its governance itself has been changing, and in many respects, 
de-coupling from the state (Mansfield 2014). This is not the ‘small state’ of 
neo-liberalism, but a parallel establishment of mutual aid. Neo-liberalism and 
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austerity did not produce this change; however, they have become part of a 
paradoxically linked dynamic. This is a theme that emerges from the paper: 
that resilience is relational, context matters. 
 
It is not only context that matters, but also the nature of the ‘composition’ of 
the cultural sector, as well as the diversity of responses to austerity, and to 
reduce state expenditures. Hence, the rejection of the physicalist and 
engineering concept of resilience which are based upon strength defending 
fragility: this we termed the ‘resilience stance’. We contrasted this with a social 
and contextual notion of adaptability where resilience did not come from a 
protection, or a limited flexibility, rather it came from a re-configuration and 
re-organisation. 
 
We showed that the cultural sector is characterised by a non-normative 
organisational structure that is not represented by the institutionalisation of, 
and by, large corporations; it is characterised instead by a large and dispersed 
network of not only small, but microenterprises, and the self-employed. 
Moreover, these enterprises and individuals are constantly re-organised on the 
basis of serial project contracting arrangements. The reason that these novel 
organisational forms have developed is in no small part as a response to the 
radical market uncertainty and risk that characterises the cultural field. So, in a 
sense, the cultural field is ‘born resilient’ 
 
Of course, the resilience of the cultural sector is not perfect and it has many 
weaknesses, especially in terms of long term growth and stability. The social 
and economic costs of constant-reinvention are high. However, the affective 
relationships that are generated via cultural labour encourage self-
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exploitation; in fact, such an affective attitude is an entry requirement to the 
sector. Added to the human costs or burn out and self-exploitation, are the 
costs of networking and organisation. Thus, the strength of flexibility comes 
with the cost of network cultivation, and particularly mediation between 
different interests. In both cases the resilience is outsourced to flexible or 
freelance workers who bear the costs and risks of uncertainty. 
 
We can highlight a number of other areas where the apparent resilience 
generates challenges. Public sector funding cuts to large scale institutions such 
as museums and galleries are routinely supplemented by charitable donations 
and sponsorship deals. In a sense this is resilient; but one that carries costs and 
new challenges in the form of the precise ‘deal’ (Pratt and Hutton 2013). The 
Tate Gallery has come under considerable criticism for example for accepting 
support from the oil company BP (Chong 2013). In the cultural field reputation 
and brand management are critically important, and fragile. So, sponsorship 
can produce other tensions labour reputation, or in other examples, control. 
 
Another form of resilience that public institutions practice is the reduction of 
labour costs by the employment of volunteers and interns. This is a form of 
socialisation of the costs, and risks, of running an institution. Not all labour is 
substitutable in this way, and smaller institutions are disproportionately 
affected. However, once again, as the institution becomes more disperse, 
expertise and knowledge is leached away; and institutions develop a 
dependency on the informal cultural sector which presents further governance 
challenges. 
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Finally, the erosion of public policy expertise and departmental budgets has led 
to a diminished capacity of the public sector to co-ordinate, let alone plan for 
culture. Whereas in the past cultural agencies allocated and dispersed 
resources, and they were configured to achieve this; today the need is to co-
ordinate and synchronise diverse cultural actors. In a core sense, the 
diminished, or closed, culture departments don’t have the capacity or skill. 
Moreover, such co-ordination would require a governance structure and public 
agency able to work horizontally, across the public agency, to exploit linkages 
to cognate areas of policy: for example, health, transport, economic 
development. It is precisely in these areas that we see initiatives developing 
that are a test to the institutional structures of governance and the silo 
mentality that comes with it (and is re-enforced by public sector management 
systems, targets and accountability).  
 
A recent example is the emergence in many cities of the post of ‘Night Mayor’. 
This post has emerged in recognition of the growth and value of the ‘night-
time economy’ to cities; but at the same time that governance structures are 
based upon a traditional day-time city, and day-time concerns. Night Mayors 
act to signal the import of the cultural economy (day and night), but critically 
to mediate between institutional structures and agencies that might not 
otherwise co-ordinate: police and licencing, and culture, planning and 
economic development. These examples point to the fact that resilience is an 
ongoing process and strategy, not simply a stance. Moreover, that resilience is 
not defined by austerity and reduction of state roles; it may in fact lead to a re-
evaluation and resurgence of strategic action by the state. However, the ‘new 
actions’ are different in character and style from those in the past. Instead of 
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allocation of grants, the approach is one of facilitating of coordination and the 
support for capacity building. This is what we mean by beyond resilience. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper has been to reflect on the notion of resilience in relation 
to the field of culture. The paper sought to de-couple the notion from neo-
liberalism and austerity. It countered with an argument that resilience as a 
concept is relational, it does not have a unitary meaning and its forms will 
change depending on context (that is the cultural field, and the field of 
governance). Moreover, that resilience as being relational is better understood 
in a network rather than hierarchy, it operates more in the horizontal than the 
vertical. 
 
The paper noted that to a large extent the cultural field has an uneasy 
relationship with government. This is not because it is ‘difficult’, rather that 
state institutions are rigid and backward looking in terms of their object: 
culture. The cultural field has, in that last half century, been extremely 
dynamic in terms of its growth and continual ‘spill-overs’ across the for and not 
for profit, the formal and informal, and the boundaries of ‘accepted’ culture.  
On one hand, the resilience of culture has emerged, due to its rapidity of 
change, and the organisational forms adopted to facilitate such change. These 
transformations have outpaced the ability of cash-strapped and cowed public 
authorities to innovate. On the other hand, the resilience of culture has been 
achieved by the socialisation of risk through temporary and unpaid labour, and 
through outsourcing innovation and training: this is not sustainable. 
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This socialisation of risks is a challenge for culture and its governance. The key 
struggle will be to provide for long term training, innovation and capacity 
building. The second, and related area, of challenge concerns the coordination 
of fragmented and diverse individuals and groups that have been created as a 
result of the headlong permanent revolution of creativity. Sacrificial labour can 
only last so long, and it tends to be focuses and self-centred. Governance is 
required to provide an analysis and to identify the strategic weaknesses, and 
responses to them. This will be the real test of resilience in the cultural field. 
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